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AN ANALYSIS OF RESTATEMENTS
DUE TO ERRORS AND AUDITOR CHANGES
BY FORTUNE 500 COMPANIES
James H. Thompson, Washington State University
Timothy L. McCoy, Lamar University
ABSTRACT
Events leading to the breakup of Arthur Anderson and Co. included the failure of Enron and
other evidence of financial reporting irregularities.  Many of these irregularities involved
restatement of financial statements due to error.  During the last several years, numerous articles
in the accounting literature and accounting press have chronicled such restatements and the often-
associated change in auditor.  This paper analyzes restatements due to error and auditor changes
made by Fortune 500 companies during 2001 and 2002 in order to assess whether restatements due
to error lowered or raised income and whether companies with income-decreasing errors showed
a greater propensity for changing auditors.  
The data in this study were taken from 8-K reports filed by Fortune 500 Companies in 2001
and 2002 and from a search of the Securities and Exchange Commission’s EDGAR database using
the word “restate” and its derivatives.  We searched for and analyzed restatements that were due
to error.  The income statement effects of these restatements were classified as income-decreasing
or as non income-decreasing.  We identified and confirmed two hypotheses related to restatements.
First, restatements generally lowered rather than raised income.  Second, companies reporting
restatements that materially reduced income were more likely to change auditors than companies
with non income-decreasing errors.  More importantly, this study extended prior research by
showing that the magnitude, not simply the direction, of a restatement was important in explaining
when a change in auditor was likely to occur.  
INTRODUCTION
Events leading to the breakup of Arthur Anderson and Co. included the failure of Enron and
other evidence of financial reporting irregularities.  Many of these irregularities involved restatement
of financial statements due to error.  During the last several years, numerous articles in the
accounting literature and accounting press have chronicled such restatements.  Accompanying these
restatements, some companies have also changed auditors (GAO, 2002; Huron Consulting Group,
2003; Thompson and Larson, 2004; Wallace, 2005).
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Some speculate that the need for restatement of financial statements creates friction between
a client and its auditor (Wallace, 2005).  In fact, some companies reportedly have decided to change
their auditor because of disagreements related to restatements.  Although companies are usually
reluctant to change auditors because of the likelihood of increased audit fees during the transition
period, such disagreements make a change in auditor a more plausible option.  The number of
auditor changes is usually very low.  The breakup of Arthur Anderson has, however, exacerbated
the number of auditor changes in 2002 (Plitch and Wei, 2004).
How often do auditor changes occur when restatements due to error take place?  What is the
effect of these restatements on financial statements?  Does the effect of such restatements play a role
in whether or not an auditor change occurs?  This paper analyzes restatements due to error and
auditor changes made by Fortune 500 companies during 2001 and 2002 in order to assess whether
restatements due to error lowered or raised income and whether companies with income-decreasing
errors were more likely to change auditors.  
BACKGROUND
A large number of articles in the accounting literature have addressed auditor change issues,
and more recently a number of articles have addressed the occurrence and impact of restatements
on financial statements.  However, the relationship between auditor changes and the impact of
restatements on financial statements is largely unexplored.
Auditor Changes
Since companies must disclose when they change auditors, investors are able to keep abreast
of the changes.  The literature regarding auditor changes has focused on several issues ranging from
frequency of change to reasons for change.   Regarding frequency of change, Auditor-Trak, a
database that follows corporate-auditor changes, reported that in 2003 each of the Big Four
accounting firms lost more public-companies audit clients than it gained.  PriceWaterhouseCoopers
took the biggest hit, losing 91 audit clients.  On the other hand, Grant Thornton, the world’s fifth
largest accounting firm picked up more than 1,000 new clients, including many defectors from the
Big Four.  The belief was that CFOs wanted more personalized attention from their audit partners,
and firms like Grant Thornton gave midsize companies more attention at a better price than the Big
Four, which specialize in service to large caps.  In addition, Auditor-Trak publisher Richard Ossoff
stated that the intense regulatory environment caused many companies to reevaluate their
relationship with their auditors.  For example, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 prohibits companies
from using the same firm for auditing and consulting services (Yoon, 2004).  Moreover, some have
suggested that mandatory rotation of registered public accounting firms should be implemented.  In
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fact, the European Council of Finance Ministers voted for mandatory auditor rotation (Bolton,
2005).
Even though companies and auditors parted at record rates in 2004 (Plitch and Wei, 2004),
the exact reason was often unclear.  In their Wall Street Journal article, Plitch and Wei reported that
75 percent of companies who changed auditors in a study by a research analyst at Glass Lewis &
Co. gave no reason for the auditor’s departure.  Because a decision to change auditors is a sensitive
decision, there are incentives for making the public disclosure as innocuous as possible.  An auditor
change has provided a signal to investors to dig deeper into matters leading to the change.
Hartwell et. al. (2001) studied the informational content of auditor changes.  Some auditor
changes signaled that potential problems exist, and others did not.  For example, auditor changes
designed to reduce audit fees, motivated by the need for additional services which the current auditor
is unable to provide, motivated by changes in the audit firm personnel, and necessitated by a change
in management do not indicate problems.  On the other hand, an auditor change due to disagreement
between the client and the auditor may indicate concerns regarding management’s integrity, the
presence of high inherent or control risk, or the clients desire to shop for an auditor who is willing
to go along with questionable practices.  The Hartwell study found that multiple-switch companies
had a significant level of financial problems as more than 22 percent received going concern
opinions.  Their findings suggested that a careful examination of the Form 8-K disclosure for
reasons given for the auditor change should be a part of every CPA firm’s client acceptance policy.
Woo and Koh (2001) employed a research methodology that classified auditor changes based
on audit and auditor characteristics and on firm characteristics.  Their findings were consistent with
those of prior studies and indicated that audit opinion, audit quality, management changes, income
manipulation opportunities, leverage, complexity and firm growth were significant auditor-change
factors.
Stafford Publications, in its data base Auditor-Trak, compiled reasons given by public
companies for auditor changes.  The publisher extracted the reasons from Form 8-K disclosures and
then used more than 20 available coded reasons to describe the reasons for an auditor change
(Stafford Publications, Ver. E-3).  Hackenbrack and Hogan (2002) further classified the publisher’s
reasons into four categories: “service-related,” “disagreement-related,” “fee-related,” and
“uninformative.”  Their study was designed to assess the relative information content of earnings
announcements reported before and after Form 8-K disclosures of the reason for an auditor change.
They found that the average price response per unit of earnings surprise was lower following an
auditor change for companies that switched for disagreement-related or fee-related reasons and
higher for those that switched for service-related reasons.
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Restatements
The occurrence and impact of restatements has received considerable attention in the
financial press and in the accounting literature recently as a result of a shower of scandals and
earnings restatements.  The Huron Consulting Group (2003) and the General Accounting Office
(2002) reported a significant increase in the number and trend of announcements of financial
statement restatements in the late 1990’s and through 2002.  The GAO reported that the number of
restatements increased by more than 170 percent over this period.
With the demise of Enron and the near-fall of other companies, such as HealthSouth and
WorldCom, Thompson and Larson (2004) reported that public confidence in financial statements
may be at an all-time low.  Although loss of public confidence stemmed from financial reporting
techniques that lacked transparency and involved numerous restatements of financial statements,
they reported that many restatements did not indicate failure of the financial reporting system.  In
fact, many of the restatements should be viewed as normal rather than unexpected.  For example,
restatements that were due to mergers and acquisitions, changes in segments, and changes in
accounting method reflected expanding business activity and were not negative in nature.
Accounting errors, on the other hand, accounted for less than 8 percent of the restatements by
Fortune 500 companies in 2001.  The occurrence and magnitude of restatements in several high
profile companies have created an image that the accounting process has failed more often than it
really has.  
The Role of Restatements in Auditor Changes
Like restatements, auditor changes were viewed negatively in the eyes of the public.  Yet,
some auditor changes did not reflect negative conditions.
Srinivasan (2004) suggested that restatements may play a role in auditor changes,
particularly restatements that decrease earnings.  In his study of data from the General Accounting
Office that tracked companies that announced restatements between 1997 and 2000 restatements
were classified into three categories: income-increasing, income-decreasing, and technical.  Income-
decreasing restatements are often viewed as negative or as evidence of aggressive accounting
practices.  Income-increasing restatements were not viewed in such a negative light despite the fact
that these restatements are still accounting failures.  Technical restatements do not imply improper
accounting; such restatements result from routine actions, such as new accounting rules.  Srinivasan
focused his research on the first type of restatement, in which the company’s profitability was better
in the original earnings statement than what it turned out to be after the restatement.  He found that
these companies’ restatements represented highly significant events.  In fact, the average cumulative
amount of net income restated was $39.5 million, a loss of nearly 10 percent of original earnings.
He noted that restatements were followed by a number of reactions, including legal challenges and
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corporate governance changes.  In more than half of the companies, the CEOs resigned; in nearly
half, the auditors changed.  By comparison, income-increasing companies in his study experienced
fewer lawsuits, less SEC enforcement action, less CEO turnover, and fewer auditor changes.  Firms
announcing technical restatement suffered no litigation or SEC action, lower rates of CEO turnover,
and fewer auditor changes than either of the other two groups.
Wallace (2005) studied restatement announcements and auditor changes from 1996 to 2002.
She found a rising number of restatements during those years for CompustatPC companies, but that
growth rate was not reflected in the number of auditor changes.  Her data indicated, however, that
auditor changes were more likely to occur in conjunction with restatements.  This result was driven
by the fact that companies with multiple restatements during this period had a higher rate of auditor
changes than companies with single restatements during this period. 
The upward trend in auditor changes continued in 2003 and 2004.  The number of SEC firms
both changing auditors and restating their financial statements more than doubled from 14 in 2003
to 30 in 2004 (Turner et. al, 2005).  Sixteen of these firms also reported internal control deficiencies
in 2004.  Auditor resignations in eleven of those cases may have resulted due to greater perceived
client risk from the deficiency.  In the remaining cases where auditors were dismissed, the uncovered
weaknesses may have strained the auditor-client relationship.  
METHODOLOGY
The data in this study were taken from 8-K reports filed by Fortune 500 Companies in 2001
and 2002 using the 2001 Fortune 500 list of companies.  We searched the Securities and Exchange
Commission’s (SEC) EDGAR database using the word “restate” and its derivatives to identify
restatements.  The years 2001 and 2002 were selected for study because these years precede and
follow the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.  
We analyzed each restatement to determine which restatements were due to error.  The
income statement effects of restatements due to error were determined and were classified as
income-decreasing or as non income-decreasing.  Except as noted, the income effects are before tax.
For this purpose, an income-decreasing error is one that reduces income by at least 5 percent; a non
income-decreasing error is one that is either income-increasing or whose income-decreasing effect
is less than 5 percent (immaterial).  In prior studies, income effects that are more than 10 percent are
usually considered material; income effects of less than 5 percent are usually considered immaterial;
the materiality of income effects between 5 and 10 percent are sometimes considered material, and
other times are considered immaterial (Srinivasan, 2004 and Hackenbrack and Hogan, 2002).
Consistent with those findings, income effects in this study of 5 percent or less are considered
immaterial, and income effects of more than 5 percent are considered material.  
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Hypothesis I of this study was:
H1: A majority of restatements due to error have the effect of reducing rather than
raising income.
This hypothesis was motivated by anecdotal evidence, such as reports by companies like
Enron, Xerox, and WorldCom, that companies had significantly overstated their income.  These
reports seldom identified instances of income-increasing errors.  The reasons for this pattern are
obvious—companies with income-increasing errors were not apt to make the headlines; also
companies that were involved in reporting irregularities were not motivated to understate income.
In addition, the authors reviewed each filing for evidence of a change in auditor.   Such
changes were reported by companies on form 8-K, disclosure item 4.  For each company, the
auditing firm dismissed and the auditing firm engaged were documented.  
Hypothesis II of this study was:
H2: Companies with material income-decreasing errors are more likely to
experience a change in auditor than companies with non income-decreasing
errors.  
Several reasons for this hypothesis existed.  First, companies that report a significant
reduction in income through restatement were often blistered in the financial press.  In an effort to
defend itself, the company attempted to transfer the blame to someone else—the auditor was the
logical scapegoat.  Second, any disagreement between a company and its auditor was likely to strain
their relationship.  When a restatement occurred, the company and its auditor often had different
ideas about the nature and effect of the error and how it should be reported.  Finally, the company
at times questioned the effectiveness of the audit firm because it failed to identify the error before
it occurred in audited financial statements.
RESULTS
Fortune 500 companies filed a total of 3,120 and 4,214 8-Ks with the SEC during 2001 and
2002, respectively.  These 8-Ks reported 89 restatements in 2001 and 80 restatements in 2002.
Table 1 shows that these restatements were due to (in decreasing frequency)  merger/acquisition,
change in segments, change in accounting method, discontinued operations/divestiture, error, change
in presentation, and change in accounting estimate.   Notably, restatements due to error accounted
for only 7 and 13 of the total number of restatements for 2001 and 2002, respectively.   Only one
company, Xerox, reported restatements in both 2001 and 2002.  The period affected by these
restatements ranged from one to five years.  
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Table 1:  Reasons for Restatements
Reason
2001 2002
Frequency Percentage Frequency Percentage
Merger/Acquisition 22 24.7% 10  12.5%
Change in Segments 21 23.6% 27  33.8%
Change in Accounting Method 18 20.2%   9  11.3%
Discontinued Operations/Divestiture 16 18.0%   9  11.3%
Error   7 7.9% 13  16.3%
Change in Presentation   3 3.4% 12  15.0%
Change in Accounting Estimate   2 2.2%   0    0.0%
Total 89 100.0% 80 100.0%
Table 2 presents information regarding the 19 Fortune 500 companies that reported
restatements due to error.  The impact of the restatements on income ranged from a 146.1 percentage
decrease to a 0.3 percentage increase.  As hypothesized, most of the restatements lowered rather than
raised income.  This finding is consistent with prior research by Srinivasan (2004) and Hackenbrack
and Hogan (2002) on income-decreasing and non income-decreasing errors.  Indeed, 13 of the 19
restatements found in this study lowered income; only one of the restatements raised income and
only by 0.3 percent.  Five of the restatements either did not affect income or their effects were
offsetting.  Companies in the shaded region of Table 2 reported income-decreasing restatements, and
companies in the non-shaded region reported non income-decreasing restatements.  In addition, the
“percentage change in pre-tax income” column of Table 2 identifies (from most negative to most
positive) the percentage of decrease or increase in income before tax for the related company.
The restatements were almost equally divided between income-decreasing and non income-
decreasing.  As hypothesized, companies with material income-decreasing restatements were more
likely to change auditors.  In fact, 6 of the 9 companies that reported income-decreasing restatements
also experienced a change in auditor.  On the other hand, none of the 10 companies that reported
non-income-decreasing restatements experienced a change in auditor.  Although the number of
restatements due to error is relatively small, these findings strongly support the hypothesis that there
was a significant association between companies with income-decreasing restatements and change
in auditor.  These findings extend prior research by Wallace (2005) and Srinivasan (2004) by
showing that the magnitude, not simply the direction of a restatement was important in explaining
when a change in auditor was likely to occur.
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Table 2:  Fortune 500 Companies with  Restatements Due to Error and Change in
Auditor During 2001 and 2002




























% Quest Communications 2002 2000-2001 Yes (146.1%)
Xerox 2002 1997-2001 Yes  (35.5%)
PNC Financial Services 2002 2001 No  (33.5%)
Dollar General 2001 1998-2000 Yes  (32.3%)
Cendant 2001 1995-1997 No  (24.5%)
Enron 2001 1997-2000 Yes   (22.1%)2
Dynegy 2002 1999-2001 Yes  (16.2%)
Interpublic Group 2002 1997-2001 No  (11.3%)





























ConAgra 2001 1998-2000 No    (4.6%)
AOL Time Warner 2002 2000-2001 No    (1.1%)
Kroger 2001 1998-1999 No    (0.5%)
Avon Products 2002 1999-2001 No    (0.1%)
Enterprise Products 2002 2000-2001 No      0.0%3
Exelon 2002 2001 No      0.0%4
Kmart 2002 2002 No      0.0%5
Reliant Resources 2002 2001 No      0.0%6
Tyson Foods 2001 1998-1999 No      0.0%2
Allegheny Energy 2002 2001-2002 No      0.3%1
1 Though there were a total of 20 restatements due to error during 2001 and 2002, Xerox reported two
    restatements.  Thus, 19 companies reported restatements due to error
2 Pre-tax income was not available.  Thus, the percentage change is based on net income.
3 Restatement affected segment income but not consolidated income.
4 Restatement affected deferred taxes and other comprehensive income but not income.
5 Error and restatement occurred within the same fiscal year; no restatement of prior years’ income occurred. 
6 Revenue and expense restatements were offsetting—no effect on income.
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CONCLUSION
Much has been written about the presence of restatements in the financial accounting and
reporting process.  This paper identified and confirmed two hypotheses related to restatements.
First, we found that material restatements due to error generally lowered rather than raised income.
Second, we documented that companies reporting restatements that materially reduced income were
more likely to change auditors.  The former finding provided further empirical support for results
of studies by Srinivasan (2004) and Hackenbrack and Hogan (2002) that showed companies more
often make errors that overstate rather than understate income.  The latter finding confirmed prior
research by Wallace (2005) and Srinivasan (2004) that suggests that a change in auditor occurs when
income-decreasing restatements become necessary.  More importantly, this study extended the
results of the Wallace (2005) and Srinivasan (2004) studies by showing that the magnitude, not
simply the direction, of a restatement was important in explaining when a change in auditor was
likely to occur.  While this research provided strong support for the stated hypotheses, additional
research is needed.  This study only considered Fortune 500 companies with restatements due to
error for the years 2001 and 2002.  Future research should consider a larger number of restatements
that spans a longer period of time.    
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APPENDIX A
Selected Financial Statement Data for Companies
Experiencing Both Restatement and Change in Auditor
During 2001 and 2002
Dollar General - 2001 Restatements
Year
Pretax Income - $ Millions # of
Shares
Millions
Pretax Income - Per Share %
Change
Reported Restated Change Reported Restated Change
1998 $ 281 $ 239 $ (42) 335.8 $ 0.84 $ 0.71 $ (0.12) -15%
1999    344    295    (49) 337.9     1.02    0.87     (0.15) -14%
2000    323    109   (214)  333.9       0.97  0.33    (0.84) -66%
Totals/Avg $ 948 $ 642 $ (306) 335.8  $ 2.82 $ 1.91 $ (0.91) -32%
Xerox- 2002 Restatements
Year
Pretax Income - $ Millions # of
Shares
Millions
Pretax Income - Per Share %
Change
Reported Restated Change Reported Restated Change
1997 $2,005 $1,287 $ (718) 653.4 $ 3.07 $ 1.97 $ (1.10) -36%
1998    579    (13)    (592) 659.0     0.88    (0.02)     (0.90) -102%
1999    1,908 1,288   (620) 663.2      2.88  1.94    (0.93) -32%
2000 (384) (367) 17  667.6 (0.58) (0.55) 0.03 4%
2001 (137) 365 502 704.2 (0.19) 0.52 0.71 366%
Totals/Avg $3,971 $2,560 $ (1,411) 669.5  $ 5.93 $ 3.82 $ (2.11) -36%
CMS Energy - 2002 Restatements
Year
Pretax Income - $ Millions # of
Shares
Millions
Pretax Income - Per Share %
Change
Reported Restated Change Reported Restated Change
2000 $    90 $   (3) $ (93) 113.1 $ 0.80 $ (0.03) $ (0.82) -103%
2001    (401)    ((331)    70 130.8     (3.07)    (2.53)    0.54 -17%
Totals/Avg $ (311) $  (334) $ (23) 121.9  $ (2.55) $ (2.74) $ (0.19) -7%
Dynegy - 2002 Restatements
Year
Pretax Income - $ Millions # of
Shares
Millions
Pretax Income - Per Share %
Change
Reported Restated Change Reported Restated Change
1999    227 197   (30) 230.0      0.99 $ 0.56  $ (0.13) -13%
2000 762 682 (80)  315.0 2.42 2.17 (0.25) -10%
2001 915 716 (199) 340.0 2.69 2.11 (0.59) -22%
Totals/Avg $1,904 $1,595 $ (309) 295.0  $ 6.45 $ 5.41 $ (1.05) -16%
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Qwest Communications - 2002 Restatements
Year
Pretax Income - $ Millions # of
Shares
Millions
Pretax Income - Per Share %
Change
Reported Restated Change Reported Restated Change
2000 126 (2,034) (2,160)  1,272.1 0.10 (1.60) (1.70) -1714%
2001 (3,958) (7,395) (3,437) 1,661.1 (2.38) (4.45) (2.07) -87%
Totals/Avg $(3,832) $(9,429) $ (5,597) 1,466.6  $ (2.61) $ (6.43) $ (3.82) -146%
Enron - 2001 Restatements
Year
Pretax Income - $ Millions # of
Shares
Millions
Pretax Income - Per Share %
Change
Reported Restated Change Reported Restated Change
1997 $  105 $     9 $ (96) 650.0 $ 0.16 $ 0.01 $ (0.15) -91%
1998    703    590    (113) 695.0     1.01    0.85     (0.16) -16%
1999    893 643   (250) 810.0      1.10  0.79    (0.31) -28%
2000 979 847 (132)  875.0 1.12 0.97 (0.15) 13%
Totals/Avg $2,680 $2,089 $ (591) 757.5  $ 3.54 $ 2.76 $ (0.78) -22%
APPENDIX B
Case Studies – Fortune 500 Companies with Errors & Auditor Changes (2001/2002)
Dollar General
On April 30, 2001, Dollar General announced that it would restate its audited financial statements for fiscal
years 1998 and 1999, as well as the unaudited financial information for the fiscal year 2000 that had been previously
released.  The company subsequently completed a review of its financial statements that identified several accounting
issues in addition to those that were announced on April 30, 2001.  Some of the accounting issues that caused the
company to restate its financial statements were:  litigation settlement expenses, COGS – Incorrect recording &
inaccurate estimates, SG&A – Incorrect recording & expenses not accrued, capital leases & financing, obligations
incorrectly recorded as operating leases, tax provision changes for correction of errors.
On September 21, 2001, Dollar General issued an 8-K that reported a change in auditor.  Deloitte & Touche
was dismissed, and Ernst & Young was engaged.
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Xerox
On April 1, 2002, Xerox announced a second restatement of its financial statements for fiscal years 1997
through 2000, as well as an adjustment to fiscal year 2001 that had been previously released.  This was the result of a
settlement with the SEC.  As in the first restatement, Xerox determined that it had misapplied GAAP in some of its
accounting practices.  The restatements were caused mostly by timing and allocation of revenue and expense recognition
from bundled leases.  Those leases were reallocated among equipment, service, supplies, and finance revenues using a
more appropriate methodology.
On October 5, 2001, Xerox issued an 8-K that reported a change in auditor.  KPMG was dismissed, and
PricewaterhouseCoopers was engaged.  KPMG was investigated by the SEC and faced lawsuits over their role in the
errors.
CMS Energy
On March 31, 2003, CMS Energy released its annual report for 2002.  As part of that annual report, the
company restated its financial statements for fiscal years 2000 and 2001.  In connection with the re-audit concerning the
practice of recording “round-trip” trades on a gross basis, CMS Energy determined to make other adjustments to its
consolidated financial statements for those years.  From May 2000 to January 2002, CMS Energy engaged in transactions
in which energy commodities were sold and repurchased at the same price.  These transactions inflated revenues,
operating expenses, accounts receivable, accounts payable, and reported trading volumes.  The company subsequently
decided that the round-trip trades should have been recorded on a net basis.  
On April 29, 2002, CMS Energy issued an 8-K to report the dismissal of Arthur Anderson as the company’s
certifying accountant.  On May 29, 2002, the company issued another 8K to report the engagement of Ernst & Young.
Dynegy
On April 11, 2003, Dynegy released its second amended annual report for 2001.  As part of that amended annual
report, the company restated its financial statements for fiscal years 1999 through 2001.  The company completed a
review of its financial statements that identified several accounting issues.  Some of the accounting issues that caused
the company to restate its financial statements were: cash flow classification, balance sheet presentation, and tax benefit
reversal, natural gas accruals versus actual results, hedge accounting, valuation of common stock issued as consideration,
valuation of long-term power contracts, incorrectly recorded operating leases, value of conversion option for
ChevronTexaco, and errors in book-tax basis differences.
On March 19, 2002, Dynegy issued an 8-K that reported a change in auditor.  Arthur Anderson was dismissed,
and PricewaterhouseCoopers was engaged.
Qwest Communications
On October 16, 2003, Qwest Communications released its annual report for 2002.  As part of that annual report,
the company restated its financial statements for fiscal years 2000 and 2001.  The company determined that, in certain
cases, they misinterpreted or misapplied GAAP.  The restatements were mainly caused by revenue recognition issues
involving optical capacity asset transactions, equipment sales, and directory publishing and purchase accounting.  
On May 31, 2002, Qwest Communications issued an 8-K that reported a change in the company’s certifying
accountant.  Arthur Anderson was dismissed, and KPMG was engaged.
